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INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND EXPORT PROMOTION IN PUERTO RICO
by Richard Weisskoff*
INTRODUCTION
Two broad sets of questions have propelled this study. The
first is historical or rather, counter-historical, and is directed
toward investigating the sources of the rapid changes in employment
and income distribution in Puerto Rico during a decade of extra
ordinary growth from 1953 to 1963. A second set of questions is more
forward-looking and projective. We seek to evaluate the impact on
the island economy both of continuing its so-called successful growth
strategy and of departing from this historical path.^ In this study,
a forty-two sector model of the Puerto Rican economy in 1963 is
*Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. The author wishes to thank
the editors for their helpful criticism. He is grateful for the
cooperation of the Puerto Rico Planning Board and the support of the
Manpower Administration of the United States Department of Labor and
to the National Science Foundation. None of these agencies are
responsible for the opinions presented here. The conclusions sum
marized in this paper were originally presented by the author in the
Research Report [30] to the Manpower Administration in July 1972.
Terminology like "island, domestic, and local," all refer to
Puerto Rico, while "mainland and abroad" refer primarily to the
United States or other economies.
constructed to trace the projection of the economy and its composition
until 1980, assuming first a continuation of historical trends and
then posing development alternatives.
The underlying view which guides this research begins with the
proposition that a small, open, export-oriented society responds to
the demands placed on it by industry and that a specific growth path
is the consequence of policy choice and promotion, not of nature or
accident. The generous if not lucrative incentives for industrial
development provided by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has led con
sciously and deliberately to the location there of production facili
ties by certain industries oriented toward mainland export and which
are integrated with mainland, not Puerto Rican, production. The pro
jections made in this study are therefore intended to serve several
purposes. They show the possible range of incomes and employment
which are likely to be attained and occupational skills likely to be
needed under different paths in the future. The projections also
pro^/ide criteria against which future population growth and employment
goals can be evaluated.
To anticipate the conclusions, the results of the ii>ndel, which
are subject to severe limitations Inheren*: ia the technique used,
suggest the limited objectives which can be achieved by continuing
the present path of industrialization in Puerto Rico. The antici
pated labor absorption in newly created jobs may be substantially
offset by labor displaced from the agricultural and service sectors.
To pursue further export-oriented industrialization acccmpanied
by accelerated productivity may fail even to provide a net increase in
jobs and lead to continuing large-scale out-migration during the next
decade. It is an objective of this research to develop the empirical
base and simulation framework for social planning or, given the current
political context, a model useful in anticipating the consequences of
different economic policies on the structure of the future society.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, HYPOTHESES AND SPECULATION
Puerto Rico*s development program, known popularly as Operation
Bootstrap, represents the quintessential prototype of export-oriented
industrialization carried out by a small country in the shadow of a
major economy. After an initial failure in the mld-1940's at direct
government ownership of a few factories, the Puerto Rican develop
mental strategists initiated a scheme of attracting branch plants of main
land industrial companies to locate on the island in hopes of creating
2
new employment needed to overcome the island's poverty. Rising
2
On the earliest industrialization efforts, compare Mathews [18]
and Tugwell's discouraged accounts [27] to the later analyses of Baer
[1], Ingram [14], E. P. Hanson [12], Ross [23], and Stead [24]. The
generation of liberal strategists and politicians included Mimoz Mar£n,
the first governor under the Commonwealth arrangement, Rafael Pico, presi
dent of the Government Development Bank, and Teodoro Moscoso, director of
the Industrial Promotion Administration (Fomento). Moscoso was to
become President Kennedy's first head of the Alliance of Progress. In
1973 he resumed the directorship of Fomento once again.
4Incomes stimulated during the wartime period were to be sustained in
a two-stage program in which Puerto Rico was to provide the social
capital and infrastructure needed for industry to locate in the
Industrial sites. The promotional incentives offered to American
Industry (which have since become standard operating procedures for
3
other industrializing countries as well), included exemptions from U.S.
profits taxes, subsidized land and utility rates, and training grants^
not to mention substantially lower wage rates in Puerto Rico com
pared to the mainland.
By one set of standards, the efforts to industrialize have
been remarkably successful. Capital has flowed into Puerto Rico.
Over 1,700 factories have been built under the promotion schemes,
3
See parallels with the policy conclusions of Little, Scitovsky and
Scott [16] and Meade [19]. Puerto Rico lies within the trade zone of
the United States and faces conmon duties on non-U.S« imports only.
Exports and imports to and from the mainland freely circulate
subject to the transportation restriction of higher cost U.S. carriers.
The inclusion of Puerto Rico with the U.S. Federal Reserve system
eliminates any problem of foreign exchange balances and convertibility.
A stable political and economic arrangement achieved, Puerto Rico has
encountered little difficulty in selling government bonds on Wall
Street or in attracting direct foreign investment. See Maldonado [17]
on the role of the financial sector.
4
and a stable, productive working force has been created. All forms
of public services have been expanded; port and transportation
facilities were improved to handle the Increasing cargo and the
retail network modernized,^ After some vacillation, the government
plunged into tourist promotion, and its success has been marked by
its impulse to the domestic construction industry and the establish-
Qient of a permanent service work force.
Despite these efforts to sustain rising incomes through export-
oriented industrialization, the total number of jobs created has
been disappointing. The neglect of the agricultural sector, espe
cially the production of sugar cane, tobacco, coffee and tropical
food crops, has led to the out-migration of large numbers of Puerto
Rican workers who could not be absorbed into the expanding industrial
sector. At the same time that the industrial promoters were imagina
tively devising methods for attracting new indutrial capital which
boosted industrial employment by 90,000 between 1950 and 1970, the
agricultural sector which accounted for nearly half the labor force
in 1950 was releasing over 1.40,000 workers.^
ronvent'loual wlsdotn on the reconstruction of the Puerto Rican
labor force daring this period maintains that the female participation
4
See Reynolds and Gregory [ 22 ] and Waggenheim ( 28 ].
^That is, relative to the inefficient marketing system described
by Galbraith and Holton [ 8 ] of the early 1950's,
6
See United States Department of Commerce [ 39 ].
rate leveled off as female workers in the home needlework trades,
once the laost important cottage industry, merely departed from the
labor force with the introduction of factories. One authority on
the recomposition of the labor force explains that with rising male
wages, job expectations of males increased as factory jobs were
provided, women stopped seeking work, and rural workers simply
withdrew their labor at low agricultural rates in favor of seasonal
migration to the United States,^
This kind of explanation, however, discounts the fragility of
the mosaic of multiple income sources. In the pre-war economy,
earnings from needlework was a critical supplement to low agricul
tural income for the rural household. With the departure of the
needlework industry from Puerto Rico and the slow decline of agri
culture, the delicate balance of family income was only partially
maintained by the more highly paid factory employment promoted in
the urban parts of the island. Families of advanced age and non-
transferable skills suffered most from the displacement of work
opportunities and encouraged the migration of mobil^i and employable
members of their families. Thus the illusory prosperity which
resulted from the successful promotion and construction of industry
is based on the mirage of rising real incomes for the employed .-^s the
declining rural sector vented Its work force, now popularly labeled
^See Reynolds and Gregory [ 21 ],
g
"surplus labor" under the new regime. The improved living standards
of those employed in the industrial sector of Puerto Rico stand in
contrast to the relative impoverishment of those for whom emplo^rment
was withdrawn.
Conventionally accepted explanations to the effect that emigra
tion was spurred by selective experiences in the higher wage markets
of New York and account for the changes in the number, age and sex
Q
distribution of the Puerto Rican labor force beg the entire question
of the mechanism which propelled the emigration, stifled domestic
opportunity, and brought about the exodus of the rural population.
The hypothesis that fewer workers would accept a minimal wage for
service or agricultural activities in favor of alternative mainland
opportunities seems plausible only when migration first became
popular and earnings began to climb. However, remaining to be told
is the other half of the story which deals with the continuing with
drawal of land from intensive cultivation and the release of workers
who, unable or unwilling accept lower wage rates, found no alter
native jobs in the island wconomy.
The question here is one of history. The sugar and tobacco
plantations had !iepn developed on the batiis of low absolute wages
which rendered the cron profitable when the land was intensively
g
See Reynolds and Gregory [22, ch. 10].
9
See particularly Reynolds and Gregory [22, p. 32], and Fried-
lander [6], By contrast, see P. Thomas [26] and G. K. Lewis [15],
farmed and manual labor extensively used. When, within a decade,
these activities no longer proved profitable, one is compelled to
investigate the specific policies that brought about the change and
ways in which they could have been altered to preserve this source
of domestic employment.
The answer to this line of inquiry lies in the prevailing
strategy of development. Industry was brought in on an open-door
basis with minimal interference from the state once the tax exemp
tions were granted. The decision had apparently been made to forego
an intensive and perhaps risky program for improving tropical agri
culture, that very activity which had supported the dense population
of the Island in the past and had been responsible for the generation
of poverty and wealth.
A major political decision was actually being implemented in
early years of Operation Bootstrap. Rather than force reform of
the sugar sector by changing tenure arrangements or by substituting
vegetables or citrus fruits for sugar cane, new industry was sought
that would rot disturb the traditional arrangements. A political
impap«e was <5Ui>tained: the U.S.-owned sugar companies were not to
be antagonized, and the industry faced a so-called natural decline
in the absence of more active intervention.
The promotion of industrialization as an alternative development
strategy to igriccltural reform amounts to a backing away from a
revolution, not the ''administration of a revolution" as depictedby a
^^See Goodsell [10].
recent popular writer. This developmental strategy, then,
effectively led to a shift in the mode of production from a rural
to an urban proletariat while retaining a similar export orientation
of production to mainland markets.The change from the open-air
factory-like plantations to conventional mechanical factories also
reduced the scale and multiplied the number of productive units.
This diffusion of the labor force reduced the competitive position
of the collective workers in any one sector during the process of
12tripartite negotiations with the employer and the state.
In the saga of the Puerto Rican industrialization, the objective
of income maintenance appears to have conflicted with and triumphed
over the objective of job maintenance. However, in a society in
which work itself is taken as the most important factor in deter
mining each individual's position, it is not enough to say that per
capita Income has risen substantially while absolute employment has
barely advanced for a growing population. The ability of the
unemployed and of those ouf:Rl<lt; the formal labor force to survive
See Mintz [20] and [21] on the fonsation of a rural proletariat
in Puerto Rico and his introduction in Guerra y Sanchez [11] for
similar formation elsewhere in the Caribbean. For a comparative
study of dependency in Puerto Rico during industrialization, see
Weisskoff and Wolff [32].
12
See Reynolds and Gregory [22] for a description of the collec
tive bargaining process.
10
by virtue of extensive family ties to working members and remit
tances of migrants* earnings from the United States may be indicative
of the divergence between the so-called success of the industrial*-
ization and the actual historical process of employment displacement.
Since the failure of the economy to provide employment opportunities
also affects intergeneration mobility and access to public services
such as education and health care, it is crucial for us to investi'
gate the sources and causes of job destruction durlug che process
of income creation. It is this task to which we now turn.
HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE LIMITS OF JOB CREATION, 1953-1963
The changes in the Puerto Rico economy from 1953 to 1963
summarize in a decade the normal growth trajectory of other so-called
developing countries in nearly half a centry. The shrinkage of the
primary agriculture sector has been more extreme, the rise in per
capita income more spectacular, and the outflow of population more
extensive in Puerto Rico than elsewhere in the developing world.
The 50 percent expansion of the industrial share and the 50
percent decline of the agricultural share in 15 years also testify
to the voracious need for labor in certain pursuits
and to the pervasiveness of inexpensive iiuports in suffocating local
13response to rising domestic consumer demand.
13Acocng the world's sniall, densely-populated, trade-dependent
countries, Puerto Rico ranks as the sixth most open economy and
11
During the decade, real per capita income rose by 90 percent
although total employment increased by only 10 percent. As ii^ipr d
medical care lowered the death rate and with the sustaining of
high birth rates, the straitjacket on population growth was thrown
of^ and the net rate of population reproduction jumped. The
unemployable workforce migrated, and the island*s resident rump
population, free to move back and forth to the mainland, grew by a
mere 10 percent in ten years, although the natural rate of increase
14
exceeded 2.5 percent per year for the same decade.
The illusory stability in size of the labor force masks the dramatic
changes which underlie its reconstitution during industrialization.
approaches European levels of per capita income and export diversifica
tion, The island enclaves of Singapore, Hong Kong, Trinidad, Malta, and
Barbados all surpass Puerto Rico in degree of openness as measured by the
share of trade to gross domestic product, but Puerto Rico remains the
most dependent on the fewest trading partners for imports and exports.
For comparisons with thirty-eight small, densely-populated, open
economies and further contrast with other Caribbean economies, see this
author and Wolff [33 and Demas [5] for remarks on the British Caribbean.
14
See P.R. Planning Board [37],
^The term illusory is applied advisedly here. First, Puerto
Ricans are full United States citizens and may travel unrestrained
to and from the continental United States. Second, stability of a
labor force which is achieved by a migration encouraged If not force?'
by economic circumstances must certainly be an illusion.
12
The compositional shifts from 1953 to 1963 are most striking in the
decline in the share of male managers and laborers, both of which reflect
the decline of farming, and of female operatives and service workers
(Table 1, columns 1 and 5, rows 2, 8, 15, and 16), The shares of crafts
men, male operatives, and clerical women (rows 5, 6, and 11) rose signi
ficantly, but the increase in the ratio of male/female workers (row 20)
suggests that the new factory jobs in light industry for women operatives
replaced by a fraction of the former female force employed in the needle
work trades. The rise in both the Gini and Kuznets coefficients and the
shifts in the Lorenz curves indicate deteriorating equality in the size
distribution of income to persons during the decade of growth.
How different might employment generation have been under
alternative hypothetical conditions, however unlikely? By means of
^^Since family income and its size distribution are known to be
sensitive to cyclical factors, it would be preferable to average the
annual size distributions for several consecutive years during the decade,
However, such information on an annual basis is scarce even in wealthier
countries.
The Gini coefficient is calculated: 1-2 ^i-1^' ^i
is the cumulated share of income received by the corresponding cumulated
share of persons,
The Kuznets coefficient is estimated: » where is the
noncumulated share of income received by the corresponding share of
persons, p^.
See Weisskoff [29] for other measures of income distribution and
this author and Figueroa [31] for comparisons of income distributions of
other Latin American countries and cities.
-13-
Table 1
PUERTO RICAN EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1953-1963
1953 1953 A,D.J 1953 D,J 1953A,Y 1963
Actual 1963 Y 1963 A,Y 1963D,J Actual
Total ('000) 548.5 1,006.4 856.3 412.0 606.2
Men (Percent)* (76.0) (73.2) (70.7) (80.5) (76.8)
1. Professionals 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.6 4.1
2. Managerial»
farm, non-farm 12.3 9.9 10.9 11.3 10.7
3. Clerical 3.4 3.5 3.4 4.7 4.7
4. Sales 6.3 4.2 6.3 6.7 7.1
5, Crafts 8.6 12.4 9.9 8.6 10.1
6. Operatives 8.8 9.7 9.5 9.5 10.4
7, Service 4.1 4.7 5.2 4.6 5.1
8. Laborers 29.1 25.1 21.5 30.8 24.0
9. Not Reported .6 .6 .6 .7 .7
Woment (Percent)"* (24.0) (26.8) (29.3) (19.4) (23.2)
10. Professionals 1.9 2.2 3.1 1.9 2.8
11. Managerial .9 .7 .9 1.0 la
12. Clerical 2.9 3.0 3.0 4.9 5.1
13. Sales .9 .6 .9 1.4 1.5
14. Crafts .1 .2 .1 .3 .4
15. Operatives 10.7 12.5 10.9 6.3 6.9
16. Service 5.6 6.8 9.6 2.5 4.3
17. Laborers .6 .5 .5 .5 .4
18. Not Reported .3 .4 .4 .6 .7
Men/Women Ratio 3.16 2.73 2.41 4.12 3.32
Measures of Income
Distribution:
Kuznets Coefficient .658 .658 .495 .722 .714
Gini Ratio .428 .428 .363 .480 .471
Lorenz Curves: percent percent percent percent
persons income persons income persons Income persons income
6.0 1.1 7.5 1.9 13.4 2.7 10.8 2.0
20.0 5.7 28.5 11,5 40.5 12.8 37.3 11.5
34.7 12.3 49.4 24.6 58.1 23.4 55.6 22,0
74.2 41.3 87.9 64.4 68.5 32.4 66.4 30.7
93.9 71.8 97.8 85.8 76,9 41.6 74.9 39.7
97.3 82.5 99.0 91.0 82.2 48.7 80.3 46.6
98.4 87.1 99.3 92.8 88.6 59.7 87.6 58.4
99,5 94.2 99.9 97.4 95.1 75.2 91.9 67.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
*May not sum due to rounding.
Notes: A = Input-Output Technology; D = Size Distribution of Income;
J En^loyment Coefficients; Y Level and Composition of Final Demand
14
FIGURE 1
LORENZ CURVE FOR THREE POINTS IN TIME
(PUERTO RiCO)
KEY> (a) 1963 ACTUAL
(b) 1953 ACTUAL
(C) 1953 INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND
MANPOWER WITH 1963 TECHNOLOGY
AND DEMAND
20 30 40 90 60 70 80 90
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF RECIPIENTS
100
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counter-historical analysis, we seek to trace those factors which
help to account for the weakness of the job creation process despite
the high level of growth. Two complete economies were constructed
for 1953 and 1963 in constant prices. For each year, the employment
and income structure, interindustry flows, and the composition of
final demands were brought together in a static accounting framework.
Each of these components were then successively substituted into
the model for the earlier, pre-industrial economy in order to observe
any change in employment and income associated with the hypothesized
substitution.^^ (See the appendix to this paper for specification
and data sources.)
How much more employment could have been generated if the economy
had been frozen at its 1953 employment and interindustry structure
yet produced sufficiently to meet the 1963 level and composition
of final demand? In effect, we are asking that the earlier pre-
industrialized structure deliver the output demanded in a later
decade, as if technological change and productivity had been
This is an exercise popularized in the economic hir^trory
as in the examination or the decline of British exports
at the turn of the 19th century by Ctonrad and Meyar [4], A similar
counter-historical technique is also used in a study of U.S.
technological change by Carter [2] in evaluating hypothetical
material input requirements under changing levels of final demand.
16
prohibited.^® Under these hypothetical conditions, total employ
ment would have risen from the 1953 base of 548,500 to
1,006,440 (Table 1, columns 1 and 2, line 1). Female employment
would have increased especially in the operative category. Even
with the 1953 productivity levels maintained, a smaller proportion
of farm managers and laborers would have been employed due to
change in the composition of the 1963 final demands.
A second model (Table 1, column 3) assumes that the 1953 employ
ment and income coefficients are still frozen, for example» by
means of rigid work and compensation rules, but that the interindustry
technology is allowed to advance to the 1963 structure. This
situation represents a partial technological transformation which
would have generated 856,300 jobs and a relatively equal income
1 8
This unlikely alternative corresponds to the complete domina
tion of work rules by a rigid, unchanging industry and may reflect
the conditions of non-Western societies in which output is increased
by replication of the basic productive unit as in a beehive. See
Geertz [9] for other examples. Moreover, certain plantation struc
tures in the Caribbean, such as Haiti and Jamaica, have undergone only
minor adaptations but have faced minor increases in export demand.
For Puerto Rico this alternative highlights the upper limit of hypo
thetical Job creation.
17
distribution (See Figure 1, curve C), implying that the changes in
the input-output structure account for a 15 percent reduction from
the potential levels of employment under conditions of straight growth
considered above. A third step, in which the technology, productivity
and final demand are all represented at the 1963 levels, is in fact
the actual 1963 economy (column 5) which offered an observed 606,200
jobs.
Ho>w much employment would have been generated by the economy if
growth had not accompanied the modernization of labor productivity
and technology? If the level and mix of the 1953 final demand and
interindustry technology remained unaltered, the introduction of
1963 labor productivity would have resulted in a 20 percent decline
of employment from the actual 1963 level, a further increase in male
over female opportunity, and a more unequal personal income distribu
tion as well (Table 1, column 4). This model is a mirror image of
the previous experiment (column 3) in which 1963 input-output
technology anH growth werr. applied to 1953 productivity. These two
simulatious reveal the full range of the impact of changing tech
nology and productivity on employment. They give us a precise
accounting of the cost of modernizing; new factories without growth
would have led to a cut in employment by over half the levels of
employment which might have resulted from growth without the produc
tivity Increases. Yet it is through* the growth process
that the new teclmology became injected iuto the labor intensive
economy.
18
ALTERNATIVE GROWTH PATHS: EXPORT PROMOTION
VERSUS IMPOIO: SUBSTITUTION
Despite the success of the export-promoting industrialization,
the significant change in the composition of the Puerto Rican labor
force may have also reduced the economy's flexibility in adapting
production policies other than those oriented toward export promo
tion. The goal ot this section is to compare the consequences of
the export-led industrialization to alternative strategies. Our
objective here is to evaluate the employment accomplishments by
contrasting the actual trajectory of growth to a number of alterna
tive paths which might have been pursued. We pose the counterfactual
question, what might the Puerto Rican economy have looked like by
1970 had a different growth strategy bf>en followed? Since the actual
set of policies are embedded in the input-output relationships and
in the occupational distribution of the simulation model, we retro
actively alter some of the historical choices in the 1963 economy,
and test out the consequences of those choices on the simulated
19growth of employment and income.
Import Substitution With Export Promotion
One alternative strategy deals with the promotion of industries
oriented toward import substitution during the export-expansion.
19
The operations involved in these adaptations are described
in the appendix .
19
How might the Puerto Rican economy have developed if an .ctempt had
20
also been made to constrain the growth of imports? A second
series of alternatives examine the effects on growth and employment
under different consumption patterns or rationing schemes. How
might the economy have developed in the face of an aggressive and
egalitarian policy of income redistribution?
In testing a sequence of import substitution programs, we
postulate first a reduction in the household sector's consumption
of direct imports by 20 percent with no further restriction imposed
on interindustry procurement. This partial import substitution
program of final household demand resulted in an 8,2 percent rise
in employment and an 8.1 percent rise in national income (Table 2,
row 2, columns 5-6). When a similar 20 percent import reduction
is extended to interindustry procurement as well as household con
sumption we find a more substantial rise in employment by 25.8
20
This type of policy could have been carried out by imposing
varying degreci, of excise taxes on selected commodities, such as
I
luxury goodr and consumer durables ostensibly for the purpose of
raising revenue. These duti'^s, however, could be adjusted to
encourage domestic production of a number of traditionally imported
goods. While it is expected that such policies might have resulted
in the short-term rise in relative prices of these domestically-
produced goods, we test here only for the net income-generating effect
of import substitution at competitive prices.
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percent and Income by 26.8 percent above the levels that the actual
economy had produced In 1970. The comparison of these two schemes
demonstrates the high dependence of Puerto Rlcan industry on imported
Intermediate inputs from the mainland and the full multiplier effects
which remain to be captured by increasing the linkages between
domestic sectors.
Next, we posited a ax>re traditional concept of import substitu
tion as practiced by the deliberate promotion of selected domestic
industries especially in the food and clothing sectors. In this
scheme, it was assumed that the household units faced no option
other than to consume all domestically-made products from the first
thirteen sectors and that intermediate goods imports of these
commodities was reduced to no more than 10 percent of total inter-
21
mediate sales. This experiment yielded slightly higher employ
ment and similar Income levels as the trajectory generated by a
22
20 percent overall import substitution strategy.
21
No substitution between sectors was permitted, although such
a consequence would be likely depending on the raafer.itade of the
rise (or decline) in relative prices which would accompany domestic
production. The sectors include agriculture, sugar cane and
milling, six food and beverage activities, tobacco, textiles,
apparel and leather products,
22
The models rest upon the assumption on an instantaneous and
infinitely elastic supply of costless capital. Although the supply
22
Input-output simulation imposes a steplike static quality
which obscures the full negative and positive impact of variations
of the above experiments during the time period. The annual cali
brations of the import substitution schemes mirror the impact of
the decrees following the base year 1963 and move proportionately,
machine-like, through time. Nevertheless, the drMiatic results of
both the 20 percent overall and selected import substitution schemes
on national income and employment are highly suggestive of the
additional dynamic gains which might accrue from a more rational
mixture of export promotion and import substitution policies.
Income Redistribution; The Egalitarian Society With
Different Consumption Patterns
One hypothesis associated with the structuralist school of
Latin American economists suggests that the redistribution of income
to the lower classes would reduce imports and spark a high domestic
growth multiplier due to both the higher domestic content and labor
23
intensity of lower-class wage goods. Thus we expected that the
of capital is in no sense costless, the profitabi]ity of a sector
and the attraction of firms to plug the import sieve is determiuea
by tflx inceatives which present no net drain to the Commonwealth
government. The selective import substituting programs could
be negotiated with the skillful manipulation of differential incen
tives .
23
See Furtado [7],
23
application of an income redistribution policy to the Puerto Rican
model would demonstrate growth in employment and output due to shifts
in demand and reduction of indirect imports. An egalitarian society
was therefore "imposed" on the Puerto Rican model which was already
partially closed by a policy of 20 percent import substitution of
household and intermediate demand. All individuals were given the
mean income and then were postulated to dispose of their family
income in a manner which empirically had been recorded as characteristic
of the mean income class of 1963, (See Table 3, column 2.)^^
That the expenditure patterns of one era could possibly apply
after such massive redistributions requires an assumption of inertia
with respect to life styles. Surely any tampering with the existing
structure of income classes would at once alter the consumption
pattern of every family. To the extent that the current middle
class life style was developed in emulation of the upper groups, the
imposition of an egalitarian living standard would, with time,
24
These expenditure patterns and the conversion of family budget
survey categories into input-output industries represent the largest
single innovation in this study. Linear functions were fitted to the
^SS'^ ^gsted budget categories for the 2,500 families in estimating the
expenditure coefficients for the fifteen expenditure classes. The
expenditure coefficients for classes 1, 5 and 15, that is, the poorest,
mean, and richest are presented in Table 3, columns 1-3.
24
lessen the imitative needs and the tendency toward conspicuous
consumption. However, the egalitarian society must provide some
basket of goods. The methodology applied here simply tests the con
sequences of the historically generated expenditure patterns on
equilibrium employment an growth of the model. (See Table 2, rows
5-7)^^
The results of the Puerto Rican experiments are topsy-turvy and
shed important light on the nature of small, dependent economies which,
despite soooe efforts to substitute imports, remains extremely open to
trade. The imposition of egalitarian income which is spent in the
average pattern of the former era leads to a slightly lower level of
employment at a slightly higher level of income than the results of the
simple import substitution program alone with no redistributionJ More
than 881,000 workers would have been employed at income levels of
25Note that the assumptions extend to the expenditure-savings ratio
which are also carried over from each of the classes. Thus in the ex
periments we assume that the newly-created egalitarian society both
consumes and saves in the manner selected from the past, although the
absolute size of the baskets is altered.
Since total personal savings in Puerto Rico has in past years
been negative and since capital formation is more closely linked with
international rather than domestic transactions, it appears more rele
vant to focus on the direct and indirect effects of distinct consumption
alternatives on production, imports, employment and income.
25
$1,727 per capita under the redistributive policies (Table 2, row 5)
compared to an alternative hypothetical employment of 900,100 at
$1720 per capita with no redistribution (row 3).
In further experiments, the expenditure patterns of the lowest
and highest classes (shown in Table 3, columns 1 and 3) were imposed
on the egalitarian population. In adopting the consumption propor
tions of the lowest income class as the norm, employment rose to a
higher level and income fell to a lower level than those achieved at
the mean expenditure pattern (see Table 2, rows 6 and 7). When the
consumption pattern of the income class 15 was imposed, employment
rose to the highest level yet and income fell to the lowest level
compared to the other consumption experiments.
These results at first glance run counter to the structuralist
intuition. In the economy examined, production for an upper class
style of consumption yields the highest net employment multiplier
and lowest domestic income generator, while production for the
lower class consumption bundle results in a lower employment multi
plier at higher income levels. The retention, or rather extension,
of a bourgeois standard yields the lowest employment levels and the
highest per capita income levels of all!
These striking results may be explained by recalling first that
the structuralist hypothesis had been developed for an economy more
self-sufficient in food, clothing and other wage commodities and more
Table 3
DISTRIBUTIONS OF EXPENDITURES AND IMPORTS FOR THREE CONSUl'ff'TION PATTERNS
(In percentages)
'le DistrlbuClon of Dlrecc Direct In^ort
Distribution of Expenditures Expenditure Household Imports Share of
_ a bv Sector Elasticity by Sector Sectoral
Sector Class 1 Class 5 Class 15 at mean Class 1 Class 5 Class 15 Expendltu:
1. Agriculture, n.e.c. .3 .4 .3 .77 3.8 4.6 4.6 27.1
4. Alcoholic Beverages .4 .8 .8 .99 .3 .6 .8 7.4
S. Non-alcoholic Beverages .4 .3 .1 .33 .2 .2 .1 7.5
6. Beer & Male .8 .a .5 .68 .3 .3 .3 3.9
9. Processed Foods 45.2 32.6 15.1 .44 24.2 18.9 11.6 53.2
10. Tobacco Products 1.9 1.3 .5 .36 3.4 2.5 1.3 78.8
11. Textiles 1.6 1.1 .4 .37 7.0 5.1 2.8 80.9
12. Apparel 11.7 8.2 3.6 .41 11.6 8.8 5.1 51.9
13. Leather 2.7 1.7 .6 .30 5.8 4.1 1.9 73.4
15. Furniture 3.3 2.8 1.7 .60 2.1 1.9 1.5 24.4
16. Paper Products .5 .4 .2 .52 .8 .7 .5 71.7
17. Printing & Publishing 1.1 1.2 .9 .74 .5 .5 .5 26.1
18. Chemicals 4.2 3.1 1.5 .46 8.6 6.9 4.4 56.3
19. Petroleum & Coal 1.4 2.1 1.8 .88 .7 1.1 1.2 12.8
20. Mineral Products .3 .2 .0 .35 .6 .4 .2 65.5
21. Primary Metals .1 .1 .1 .82 .1 .2 .2 85.6
22. Fabricated Metals .2 .3 .3 .88 .8 1.3 1.5 85.5
23. Machinery, n.e.c. .7 .6 .3 .57 1.5 1.3 1.0 79.0
24. Electrical Machinery 4.4 3.3 1.6 .47 7.3 6.0 3.9 69.3
25. Transport Equlptaent .0 5.6 12.1 1.69 .0 8.8 25.2 88.4
26. Scientll'ic Instruments .7 .5 .3 .54 1.3 1.2 .9 37.8
27. Other Manufacturing 2.0 1.8 1.1 .62 5.9 5.8 4.7 70.0
29. Construction .3 .1 1.0 1.08 .0 .0 .0 0.0
33. Transportation ,0 3.0 3.9 1.23 .0 3.8 6.6 17.6
34. Communication .0 .0 .8 1.15 .0 .1 .2 8.4
35. Banking ,0 .0 12.1 5.79 .0 .0 8.0 0.0
36. Insurance .0 2.2 6.9 2.06 .0 1.9 .0 75.7
37. Real Estate 7.6 6.4 3.7 .57 .0 .0 .0 0.0
38. Personal Services 3.1 3.9 3.2 .81 .0 .0 .0 0.0
39. Business Services .0 .0 .0 .49 .0 .0 .0 0.0
40. Medical Services .5 3.1 3.7 1.14 .0 .0 .0 0.0
41. Services, n.e.c. .0 3.0 10.0 2.07 .0 .0 .0 0.0
42. Hotels & Restaurants .0 .5 2.4 2.43 .0 .0 .0 0.0
43. Recreation .0 1.4 2.0 1.31 .0 .0 .0 0.0
44. Electricity & Gas 2.6 2.2 1.3 .58 .0 .0 .0 0.0
45. Water & Sanitation .9 .8 .5 .63 .0 .0 .0 0.0
46. Commonwealth Government 1.1 1.7 1.5 .88 .0 .0 .0 0.0
47. Household Industry .0 1.3 3.1 1.79 .0 .0 .0 0.0
48. Federal Government ,2 .2 .1 .64 13.3 13.1 11.0 82.3
TOTALS
Q 100.0 99.8 100.0 .98'^ 100.1 100.1 100.0
Overall Economy 3.5 10.1 5.9 1,01® 41.8 35.2 28.1 39.5
Sub-sets:
.17^9 Primary Sectors 1,4-6,9-13 72.2 52.4 24.3 56.6 45.1 28.5 42.7®
13 Dumbles ScctorH 14-27 18.9 22.0 21.9 •21. 30.2 36.1 45.7 59.4^16 Survlov Sectors 29,33-48 16.1 30.2 56.2 13.3 18.9 25.8 11.5^
KanKt; Income Per Capita $1-200 $801-1000 >$4,801
Mean Expenditure Per Capita $239 $998 $6,514
Mean Incoise Per Capita S132 $893 $15,261
Net Domestic Expenditure Coefficient
Notes:
.870 .657 .427
a. Sectors whose purchases account for at least .1 percent of total expenditure of the Incorae class. Excludes
Imputations.
b. Not elsewhere classified.
c. Sub-set entries represent averages for the sectoral groups, rather than euas as in other columns.
d. Weighted by budget shares, , el,, where e, « expenditure on each sector 1.
e. Refers to elasticity of total expenditure on all sectors with respect to income calculated at the mean of
income class 5, or n
e.y
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autonomous in the generation of its own capital. Both the Import
leakage associated with lower income class expenditures and the
labor intensity of upper class expenditures combine to yield results
which are the reverse of those hypothesized for the larger, more
autonomous nations of Latin America. In the Puerto Rican case, the
consumption bundle of the poor is composed to a large share of com
modities such as synthetic textiles, processed foods, and light
appliances which are either produced locally in the high-wage manu
facturing sectors or imported from abroad, resulting in a low
domestic employment multiplier and high Import leakage. On the
other hand, the expenditure pattern of the upper class consists of
heavy outlays for domestically-produced services and remitted savings.
The former leads to high domestic employment, while the latter
27weakens the domestic income multiplier. Ironically, the imposition
26
I am indebted to discussions with Celso Furtado and the
graduate research seminar in Latin American economy at Queen's
College, Cambridge, and to David Evans and the research seminar of
the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Sussex in
April 1975 following the Input-Output Conference in Vienna.
27
Mean expenditure and incomes for each of the three Income
classes appear in the bottom rows of Table 3. Negative aggregate
savings for Puerto Rico is sustained by the influx of easy credit
from North American lending institutions and by rapidly rising incomes,
The net effect of losses due to remitted savings and direct
imports for each Income class is shown on the bottom line of Table 3,
27
of the middle standard yields the highest income multiplier and the
lowest employment multiplier. The former is the consequence of the
*low savings ratio, while the latter is due to the high wage and
high productivity nature of connnodity purchases.
The relative indifference of the Puerto Rican economy to react
to the shock of major income redistribution demonstrates the insularity
of industrial production from local needs. Even with the imposition
of import substitution policies, the island economy is geared primarily
for export. More than simply a partial closing of the existing stuc-
ture or major shifts in expenditure proportions are apparently required
to stimulate real growth.
THE TESTING OF im)USTRIAL POLICY: EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS, 1970-1980
If Puerto Rico continues to grow in the decade 1970-1980 at rates
similar to the past decade, what employment levels and distribution
can be expected? How sensitive are these to the particular mix of
exogenous demands? Does the society have much of a choice in its
ability to create jobs for an increase in population?
A series of experiments were devised to assist in the prediction
of the effects of a continuation of current growth policies on the
Puerto Rican society. Based on an extension of the final demand model,
the simulations were performed by projecting levels of exports and
exogenous investment to 1980 on the basis of current trends and tnoni-
toring their feedback on interindustry flows, employment, and consump-
28tion as captured within the economy.
28
A key assumption of the model built into the fixed coefficients
28
The 1963 general equilibrium model was first calibrated by simple
annual charting of industrial growth and employment to 1970 by the
application of annual aggregates of final demand which are considered
29to be exogenous to the economy. Since overall final demand grew at
the rate of 12.7 percent a year in constant prices, we selected a
range of rates from 10.0 percent to 15.0 percent for each of the three
major components of final demand (see Table 4, columns 2-4). In a
second set of projections, the growth rates of the construction and
export components of final demand were varied differentially (columns
skill classes. This may not be too unrealistic, given the availability
of mainland managers and the return migration, and no attempt in this
study has been made to evaluate the impact of wage differentials
between the mainland and Puerto Rico in attracting or severing workers.
The model is pulled by demand and assumes that trained labor appears
instantaneously, ready to fill the positions created by the alternative
paths. A particular set of promoted industries is seen as generating
jobs directly and indirectly, and the full impact of these developments
are estimated to give a view of the possible structure of jobs in the
next years if these conditions continue.
29
Discrepancies between a simple straight line projection of
employment and actual employment between 1963 and 1970 were attributed
to changes in productivity. These historical rates of increasing
productivity were continued to 1980.
t-J
Table 4
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION;
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS FOR 1980
(adjusted for productivity changes)
Actual Program of
Balanced Growth
Conatruction
Boom
Export
Promotion Boom
1970 1980-1 1980-11 1980-III 1980-IV 1980-V 1980-VI 1980-VII
(1) (2) (3) (4) C5) (6) (7) (8)
Program Description;
Overall Exogenous Demand
K
Annual Growth Rate 12.7 10.0 12.7'' 15.0 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7
Construction Investment
Annual Growth Rdte 16.T*' 10.0 12.7 15.0 16.7^ 20.0 12.7 12.7
Export Demand
K b
Annual Growth Rate 11.6^ 10.0 12,7 15.0 12.7 12.7 11.6° 14.0
Employment Projected (percent):
Men:
» Professional 5.1 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.7 6.0 5.8
Managerial 9.5 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.5 8.6
Clerical 5.7 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.1 5.8 6.4 6.2
Sales 7.4 6.9 7.0 7.1 6.8 6.6 6.9 7.1
Crafts 12.3 12.6 12.5 12.5 13.7 14.8 12.7 12.3
Operative 11.4 11.4 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.7 11.4 11.8
Service 6.4 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.1 6.8 7.5 7.2
Labor 13.7 8.6 8.5 8.5 9.1 9.7 8.6 8.4
Not Reported .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
Women:
Professional 3.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5
Managerial 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Clerical 6.2 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.7 6.5 7.1 6.9
Sales 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4
Crafts .4 .5 .5 .5 .5 .4 .5 .5
Operative 8.3 9.3 9.4 9.4 8.9 8.4 9.0 9.8
Service 5.6 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.7
Labor .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2
Not Reported .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
Totals® 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Employment (IqOO'b) 715.5 829.1 1093.6 1358.4 1185.8 1287.5 1040.7 1157.3
Percentage Increase in
Employment 1970-1980 15.9 52.8 89.9 65.7 77.9 45.5 61.8
Men/Women Ratio 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.1
N*&tes:
Stay not sun exactly due to rounding errors.
' Denotes historic annual growth rate from 1963 to 1970,
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5-8). The results of these alternatives provide us with estimates
of the employment range that might be expected in Puerto Rico by
1980.
The resulting levels vary from a low demand for workers of
829,100 for a 10 percent annual balanced growth rate to 1,358,400
achieved at a 15 percent annual balanced growth rate. The
particular composition of skills and occupations which are
the consequence of these growth paths are suggestive of the actual
supply of jobs available to the society. We note that various
programs and growth rates all generate almost identical occupational
distributions of employment. However, compared to the actual 1970
distribution-, the 1980 projections present an alarming picture. The
most significant change is reflected in the sharp decline in the
share of laboring men from 13.7 to 8.5 percent and the somewhat
smaller decline in the share of managerial men. Both of these
compositional changes are associated with the continued deteriora
tion of the agricultural sector. The slack is taken up by men and
women in the service occupations and by women in the operative,
clerical, and professional categories. All programs reveal the
relative decrease in male relative to female employment opportunity
as summarized in the decline of the man/womau employment j.-3tio from
2.6 in 1970 to 2.4 for the construction boom and 2.1 for ^he export
boom (Table 4, columns 1, 6, and 8). These results point to the
likelihood of continued out-migration of substantial numbers of
il
unemployable male laborers, despite the rise in overall employ-
. 30ment.
CONCLUDING SPECULATION ON FUTURE POLICIES
If the national goal is the achievement of an economy capable
of providing jobs for the current labor force on the island
rather than on the mainland, then a radical strategy of development
may be needed that builds on the current industrial structure.
The current dilenana lies in choosing the direction of future activity,
30All the straight-line projections except the 10 percent
balanced growth program imply a demand for labor which could easily
cope with a 3 percent annual growth in the labor force. However,
should the Puerto Rico industrial growth rate show, especially, with
a downturn of the U.S. economy, or should the mix of new industries
be considerably less labor demanding than the previous promoted
plants^ or should the first generation of high employment factories
leave Puerto Rico for other low-wage, tax-exempt islands, then the
actual achieved employment for 1980 is likely to fall far short
of the optimistic projections in Table 4. At the time of this revi
sion (1975), all three of these effects are acting as brakes on net
job creation, and, with the deepening recession in North America,
Puerto Rico's return migration swells the ranks of the unemployed
and augments the natural growth of the labor force.
32
The pursuit of an import-substitution policy and the termination
of the export promotion strategy may be a practical alternative in the
search for real job creation, especially in light of the array of
sophisticated manufacturing already carried out in Puerto Rico. While
other developing countries have found technology accessible and skills
easily transferable in the early phases of import substitution, it has
been the backward integration into primary production and the exporta
tion of industrial products which have proved a difficult stage for
31
other developing countries.
Puerto Rico, however, approaches the development trajectory in
reverse. Having created a skilled labor force and having already
tnastered several complex phases of production, the economy has
already overcome the classic difficulties of import substitution,
'•/hat remains is to move forward in the production process and design
ttn operational set of incentives which encourages the su*^stitution
of domestic products for imports without jeopardizing i'uerto llico's
current market arrangement with the United States. Cne major draw
back may lie in the anticipated cost increases of the i'jp:rt-substi-
tuting industries while local producers l^arn to compete with inter
national imports. An excise tax on imported luxury models could
31
See Tavares [25J.
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protect local production and concentrate demand on basic consumer
goods and away from the proliferated models now popularized through
extensive franchising of mainland companies. Differential and
preferential tax incentives could be offered to attract those industries
which could supply local needs, and the payroent of even nominal
corporate profits by other industries could be used as a transfer to
the less competitive local industries, enabling them to match inter
national prices. It is in the use of the planning model to formulate
programs to promote domestic employment at living income levels rather
Chan reduced employment at higher incomes that further empirical
research must be directed.
34
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Historical Comparisons . 1953-1963
Historical comparisons are based on the reconciliation of two
complete sets of accounts for 1953 and 1963;
(1)
where = vector of gross output values by sector
A - matrix of technical coefficients
a vector of final demands by sector
i,j = 1 ... 8
Total value added is related to gross output;
V. = 1 . X Q (2)
J
where = row vector of value added by sector
A
Q = diagonal matrix of value added coefficients
A portion of the value added is either received by families as
earnings and profits (W^) or retained and remitted abroad (W^), All
personal income received by families is distributed according
LO different income levels and the sector of household h'='*id.
W- - V. R (3)
J
where « row vector of value added received b/ families
originating in sector i.
A
R = diagonal matrix of ratioj of family income to value
added by sector.
W = V - W (4)
j ^ j
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where W * vcctor of residual value added not distributed to
r
^ by sector.
S, . = D W.
kl £.
where S. . « «8t:rix of total family income received by income
ki
class k from each sector jL
k - 1 ... 9
D = coefficient matrix of family income by income class
and sector
Ski
where G. ® matrix of the number of people in each income class
ki
by sector of income.
k » 1 ... 9
H * diagonal matrix of income per person by sector of
household head and by income class.
The matrix of the size distribution of income generated to families
by each sector (D) summarizes the earning and owning practices for
each industry. The matrix H above expresses a fixed scale in the
distribution of relative incomes, and the number of people that are
supported varies directly with the level of sectoral output, as does
the number of jobs:
where J = matrix of employment coefficients by sex and occupa
tion per dollar of sectoral output
1 - 1 ... 10.
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A polar formulation of job and Income determination could
restrict the absolute number of workers per sector, with rising
sectoral output leading to higher absolute incomes across the
entire distribution. The assumption of infinite elasticity of
labor supply as expressed in (6) and (7) was preferred in view
especially of the high geographic and occupational mobility.
Actually, most sectors reflect changes both in the levels and dis
tribution of personal income originating in that sector during
the period.
In Table 1, columns 3-5, the hypothetical combination of the
employment matrix J, of year s, the interindustry technology. A,
of year t, and final demand, Y, of year u determine the potential
employment,
K®"" = J® y" (7a)
where the superscripts s, t, and u correspond to yearwise
substitutions for 1953 and 1953.
The shares of recipipn..s ordered by income class, their
corresponding income shareL>, are summarized in the Lorenz
curv»..-^ and the Kuznets and Gini coefficients of Table 1 for different
historical substitutions:
gStu ^ -1 Qt
ki ij
Simulation Model of Alternative Paths: Import Substitution,
Income Redistribution and Growth, 1963-1970-1980
The model used for charting alternative paths from 1963 to 1970
and the different growth projections to 1980 follows the above
37
formulation with several augmentations. First, the scale of analysis
is more disaggregated: i, j = 1 ... 49; k = 1 ... 15; and 1 « 1 ... 18.
Second, the 1963 vector of final household expenditures by
sector is disaggregated by income class, using the 400 commodity
by 49 industry input-output codes for Puerto Rico as a guide to the
regrouping of 2500 budget surveys for 1963. Total household consump
tion for each industry was distributed across expenditure classes
according to a system of estimated linear expenditure functions and
aggregate expenditure/income ratios by class.
\ = Xk H (8)
where \ » vector of expenditure/income ratios per person for
each income class
E, ® vector of expenditure per person for each incomc class k
iC
E.k = a 1 + 3 (9)
where a, p = vectors of constants and slopes for linear expen
diture functions by sector and class
'^ k <1°)
A
where = total household consumption of final demand
Let A be the augmented matrix of the 49-order internindustry flox"
extended downward by the distribution of value added to families into
15 income classes and extended laterally by the allocation of hoiise-
hold consumption to 15 expenditure classes. The separation of direct
imports of household consumption, from total imparts, M, completes
the specification of the endogenous and exogenous components of final
demand.
From (1) :
I-M-A
L -V
M.-C
X
I J
38
-1
where Y includes the exogenous components of final demand of
capital formation, inventory change, exports, and govern'
ment expenditures.
39
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